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AbsTrACT
background Taxing soft-drinks may reduce their 
purchase, but assessing the impact on health demands 
wider consideration on alternative beverage choices. 
Effects on alcoholic drinks are of particular concern, as 
many contain similar or greater amounts of sugar than 
soft-drinks and have additional health harms. Changes in 
consumption of alcoholic drinks may reinforce or negate 
the intended effect of price changes for soft-drinks.
Methods A partial demand model, adapted from the 
Almost Ideal Demand System, was applied to Kantar 
Worldpanel data from 31 919 households from January 
2012 to December 2013, covering drink purchases for 
home consumption, providing ~6 million purchases 
aggregated into 11 groups, including three levels of 
soft-drink, three of other non-alcoholic drinks and five of 
alcoholic drinks.
results An increase in the price of high-sugar drinks 
leads to an increase in the purchase of lager, an increase 
in the price of medium-sugar drinks reduces purchases 
of alcoholic drinks, while an increase in the price of diet/
low-sugar drinks increases purchases of beer, cider and 
wines. Overall, the effects of price rises are greatest in 
the low-income group.
Conclusion Increasing the price of soft-drinks may 
change purchase patterns for alcohol. Increasing the 
price of medium-sugar drinks has the potential to have 
a multiplier-effect beneficial to health through reducing 
alcohol purchases, with the converse for increases in 
the price of diet-drinks. Although the reasons for such 
associations cannot be explained from this analysis, 
requiring further study, the design of fiscal interventions 
should now consider these wider potential outcomes.
InTroduCTIon
With the global prevalence of obesity and associ-
ated health risks rising,1 2 health-related taxes have 
become an established policy option intended to 
reduce energy intake. Many of these have focused 
on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), due to their 
consistent association with energy intake, weight 
gain, and risk of cardiovascular disease and type 
two diabetes.3 Hungary, Finland, France, Belgium, 
Portugal, Mexico, Chile, Thailand, Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab Emirates are among the countries 
that have recently applied taxes on SSBs at least 
partly due to population health concerns.4 In the 
USA, at least five local jurisdictions currently have 
a health-related tax on sugary drinks, while cities 
of Seattle and San Francisco propose to implement 
one in 2018.4 There are similar plans across a 
number of other countries such as India, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Israel and South Africa.5 
The UK government has confirmed an industry levy 
to incentivise producers to reformulate their prod-
ucts or, if not, to increase the price of SSBs.6 
A number of studies have modelled the potential 
impact of food-related taxes on health outcomes.7 8 
While economic theory predicts an inverse relation-
ship between the price of SSBs and the quantity 
purchased, and hence consumed, people allocate 
their budget between many different foods and 
beverages based on their relative prices, making 
it imperative to consider the inter-relationships 
between the subject of the tax (SSB) and other 
drinks and foods.9 The net effect of a price increase 
of SSB on energy intake is thus ambiguous. For 
instance, when the price of an SSB increases, 
consumers may shift their consumption towards 
other energy-containing beverages, such as juices, 
milk-based or alcoholic drinks. If so, daily energy 
intake might be unaffected, or even increased. 
Alternatively, they may shift consumption towards 
diet drinks or water, leading to a net reduction in 
energy intake. Further, the effect of price increases 
is likely to be heterogenous, as price responsiveness 
will vary across income groups,10–12 and consump-
tion intensity, with high consumers of SSBs being 
potentially less sensitive to price changes.10 13 14
Research suggests that increasing the price of 
SSBs generates a small, but significant, reduction in 
their purchase (broadly, a 10% price rise reduces 
purchase by 6%–8%), with a more pronounced 
effect in poorer households, and that substitution 
towards other soft-drink categories only minimally 
offsets the energy reductions achieved through 
decreases in SSBs.12 15–23 However, little is known 
of the potential effects on consumption of alcoholic 
beverages. Beer and wine provide on average 43 and 
85 kcals per 100 mL, respectively, in comparison to 
40 kcal in 100 mL of Cola drink. Adults in the UK 
on average consume 106 kcals per head per day 
from alcoholic drinks, compared with 98 kcal from 
SSB.24 The two studies that have considered both 
alcohol and SSBs have found no significant associ-
ations,15 22 but this could be due to modelling alco-
holic and non-alcoholic drinks separately, where 
consumers first allocate their expenditure between 
broad food and beverage categories (ie, between 
‘non-alcoholic drinks’ and ‘alcoholic drinks’) and 
then in a second step between more disaggregate 
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groups within these broad categories (eg, among different types 
of ‘non-alcoholic drinks’). This restricts the ability to examine 
relationships between alcohol and non-alcohol-based drinks 
directly.
Overall, our understanding of how public policies to increase 
the price of SSBs may affect the consumption of alcoholic drinks, 
and hence total energy intake, remains very limited. The research 
presented here is the first to provide a direct analysis of the rela-
tionship between price increases for SSBs and alcohol purchases, 
across different income groups.
MeThods
To estimate the relationship between a change in price of SSBs, 
and associated purchase of SSBs, other non-alcoholic and alco-
holic beverages, we used a partial demand model, adapted from 
the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to household expen-
diture data from January 2012 to December 2013, provided by 
Kantar Worldpanel. Kantar Worldpanel includes information 
on household expenditures from a sample of GB households 
(~32 000), representative of the population with respect to 
household size, number of children, social class, geographical 
region and age group, on food and drink purchases for home 
consumption made in a variety of outlets, including major 
retailers, supermarkets, butchers, greengrocers, and corner 
shops. The dataset consists of individual transactions (entered 
by the household using scanners for barcodes, or manual entry 
where there is no bar code), providing detailed information 
on the day of purchase, outlet, amount spent, and volume 
purchased. In addition, Kantar Worldpanel annually collects 
socio-demographic information for each household, such as 
household size and composition, income group, social class, 
tenure and geographical location (postcode district), as well as 
age, gender, ethnicity and highest educational classification of 
the main shopper. Analysis is at the level of the household, not 
each individual within that household (ie, we can observe what 
the household purchased in terms of beverages, but not which 
individual – such as child or adult – consumed them).
The full dataset consists of 31 919 households, of which 80% 
appear in both years (25,535), providing ~6 million beverage 
purchases disaggregated at the brand and package level, which 
were aggregated into 11 distinct beverage groups for this study: 
(i) high-sugar drinks, containing more than 8 g sugar/100 mL 
(assuming a dilution rate of 1:4 as used by the British Soft 
Drinks Association for concentrated SSBs); (ii) medium-sugar 
drinks, with 5–8 g sugar/100 mL; (iii) diet/low-sugar drinks, 
with less than 5 g sugar/100 mL; (iv) fruit juices; (v) milk-based 
drinks (excluding pure milk); (vi) water; (vii) beer; (viii) lager; 
(ix) cider; (x) wines; and (xi) spirits. Note that the high-, 
medium-, and low-sugar drinks are grouped to match the struc-
ture of the proposed levy on sugary drinks producers in the UK 
which will be enacted in April 2018.6 As many beverages are 
storable and not purchased very frequently, data was aggre-
gated at 4 week intervals for each household, providing a total 
of 575 965 household-month observations. Even at this level of 
aggregation, a substantial amount of zero expenditure months 
remain, as most households do not buy beverages from each 
category of drinks every month, and some households never buy 
certain categories during the whole sample period (ranging from 
15% for fruit juices to over 50% for cider). A two-step proce-
dure was followed to take account of this censoring of the depen-
dent variable in the estimation strategy. The AIDS approach was 
adapted for the panel data context to allow control for unob-
served household heterogeneity via a fixed effects specification. 
The full specification, including the procedures for handling 
censoring, endogeneity of prices and total expenditure, and esti-
mation of price elasticities is provided in online supplementary 
appendix 1.
results
Table 1 presents the socio-demographic profile of the sample. 
A comparison of Kantar Worldpanel with representative house-
hold data from the Living Cost and Food survey (LCF) has found 
the sociodemographic and regional profiles of the samples to 
match well, although our sample has a slightly higher share of 
(i) low-income households, (ii) households that own a computer 
and/or a car, and (iii) households in the South and Southeast of 
England.25
Table 2 presents average expenditure, volume and expenditure 
shares across all households and split into three income groups. 
The critical aspect for analysis here is the expenditure share, 
where there is a clear social gradient with respect to beverage 
expenditure. The low-income group spend 48% of total drink 
expenditure on the three soft-drink groups, compared with 44% 
and 39% for medium- and high-income groups respectively. The 
reverse is seen for juice drinks, with 12%, 13% and 16% spent 
respectively by low-, medium- and high-income groups. In terms 
of alcohol, spirits are purchased more by low-income households 
(9% vs 8% and 7%), whereas the reverse is the case for wines 
(where high-income group spends 22%, compared with 19% for 
the medium-income group and 15% for the low-income group). 
Most other categories have equivalent expenditure shares across 
the income groups.
The full results of the unconditional, uncompensated own- 
and cross price elasticities are presented in online supplemen-
tary appendix 2. In sum, we found that own-price elasticities for 
non-alcoholic drinks are lower than for alcoholic beverages (that 
is, alcoholic drinks are more sensitive to price change), and that 
elasticities for all three SSB groups are inelastic (ie, smaller than 
1), which means that there is a less than proportionate decrease 
in purchase following a price rise. This also compares with 
relatively inelastic (ie, insensitive) reactions to changes in the 
price of alcoholic drinks (except for lager for low- and medium- 
income groups, and cider and wine for the high-income group).
Of more interest, is the impact on alcohol purchases when 
the price of SSBs increases. Figures 1–4 present the (statically 
significant, P<0.05) impacts on alcohol beverage purchase from 
a change in price of (high- and medium-sugar) SSBs for the total 
sample (figure 1) and then for each income group (figures 2–4).
In aggregate across all income groups (figure 1) there are 
clear differences by category of SSB. Increases in the price of 
high-sugar SSBs are associated with increased purchases of diet 
drinks, juice and lager (ie, they act as substitutes), whereas they 
decrease purchases of medium-sugar SSBs and spirits (ie, they act 
as complements). Increases in the price of medium-sugar SSBs 
impacts across a wider range (high-sugar SSBs, juice, water, beer, 
lager, wines and spirits), although all categories affected witness 
reduced purchasing (ie, a consistent complementary relationship 
of ~0·1% for a 1% price increase). Increases in the price of diet/
low sugar SSBs increases the purchases for all other categories 
(with the exception of the two other SSB categories), ranging 
from 0·1% for juice to 0·7% for milk-based drinks and spirits 
per 1% price increase.
Although many of the associations at the aggregate level are 
replicated across income groups, the effect of increasing the 
price of SSBs on purchases of other beverages shows some vari-
ance by income group, particularly for the high-income versus 
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the low- and medium-income groups. In the high-income group, 
increases in the price of high-sugar SSBs decreases the purchase 
of cider (0·5% for 1% price increase), while in the middle- 
income group it reduces the purchases of spirits (0.2% for 1% 
price increase) but no decrease is evident in alcohol purchases 
in the low-income group. For medium-income groups there is 
also an increase in lager purchase if the price of high-sugar SSB 
increases. For an increase in the price of medium-sugar drinks, a 
common pattern is seen of complementary purchases, predom-
inantly with juice and lager, across all income groups; although 
of different magnitudes.
dIsCussIon
The own-price elasticities we found for SSB fall within the 
range reported in existing literature,7  and while the own-price 
elasticities for alcohol are higher than those found in meta- 
analyses,26–28 they are in line with recent studies for the UK.29 
Overall this suggests some convergent validity of the current 
results, suggesting that price may be a more effective interven-
tion for reducing alcoholic than non-alcoholic drinks.
In terms of cross-price elasticities, a price increase for SSB is 
likely to have a differential effect according to the sugar-content 
level of the SSB and across income groups. This mixed picture 
indicates the complexity of estimating the impact of a single 
price increase. Increasing the price of high-sugar SSBs leads to 
an increase in the purchase of lager, which could negate some 
of the beneficial impact of the reduction in purchase of SSBs. In 
contrast, a price increase for medium -sugar SSBs has the most 
significant impact as it produces a complementary reduction in 
several other beverages, many of which will enhance the impact 
on reductions in dietary sugar and energy intake. With respect 
to alcohol, this relationship is important as it suggest that a price 
rise could have small knock-on effects on beer, lager and wine 
purchases and thus multiply the health benefits from reduced SSB 
consumption by simultaneously reducing alcohol consumption. 
This suggests that it is important to consider the threshold of 
sugar content at which a price rise would be associated. The very 
different findings for a price increase on diet/low-sugar SSBs, 
which are associated with increases in alcoholic beverages (with 
the exception of spirits), provides a strong case for ensuring that 
diet drinks are excluded from price increases.
The responsiveness to price change for high- and medium-sugar 
drinks is slightly higher in low-income groups, especially relative 
to high-income groups and there are several significant impacts 
on expenditure shares for other beverages, including alcoholic 
purchases, which encompass a wider selection of alcoholic prod-
ucts. With one exception, these relationships are all complemen-
tary, indicating a reduction in alcohol purchase as the price of 
SSB increases, thus conferring potentially greater health benefits 
to those on lower incomes. However, most of this effect is driven 
by changes in price to the medium-sugar drinks.
The marked difference between those soft-drinks containing 
medium versus high levels of sugar is worth noting. Most 
policy, enacted or proposed, and research to date, has only 
distinguished between no or low-sugar beverages and ‘sugar- 
sweetened’ beverages, and so produced a binary relationship. 
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of study sample
All households Low-income Mid-income high-income
Number of HH’s 31 919 11 422 15 680 4817
Number of observations 575 965 198 464 287 966 89 535
Household size 2.7 (1.3) 2.3 (1.3) 2.9 (1.3) 3.2 (1.2)
Age of main shopper 47.8 (15.3) 52.4 (17.0) 46.0 (14.3) 42.9 (10.7)
Number of children if have children 1.7 (0.8) 1.8 (0.87) 1.8 (0.86) 1.7 (0.75)
Share of households that have children 0.38 0.29 0.42 0.5
Social class % of households
  Class A&B (highly skilled) 20.2 5.7 20.9 52.6
  Class C1 37.6 30.6 43.1 36.3
  Class C2 18.0 15.7 22.4 9.2
  Class D 13.9 22.0 11.7 1.7
  Class E (unskilled) 10.3 26.1 1.9 0.3
Highest qualification % of households
  Degree or higher 24.2 11.64 25.99 48.02
  Higher education 13.5 11.65 15.33 12.14
  A Level 11.7 9.96 13.25 10.61
  GCSE 18.9 22.38 18.93 10.8
  Other 7.6 11.64 6.05 3.13
  None 7.6 15.25 4.06 0.93
  Unknown 16.5 17.48 16.4 14.37
Tenure % of households
  Owned outright 24.31 29.66 22.91 16.21
  Mortgaged 40.09 17.19 47.64 69.82
  Rented 29.64 46.42 23.54 9.72
  Other 1.46 1.8 1.39 0.79
  Unknown 4.5 4.89 4.52 3.47
Low income <£20 000 per year; mid-income £20 000 – £49 000; high-income >£50 000+.
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The analysis presented here however indicates that collapsing 
SSBs into no-sugar versus sugar drinks may lose important 
nuances, and significantly that a price increase only on high-
sugar content beverages will have a far lower cumulative effect 
than price increases which also include medium sugar drinks. 
Together with the likely adverse impact on alcohol purchases 
from increasing the price of diet/low-sugar beverages, policy 
may be more effective through a more nuanced consideration 
of price options across a range of beverages as in the soft drink 
industry levy proposed for the UK.
There are, of course, limitations to the analysis presented 
here. The data, although large, representative and detailed, may 
be subject to under-recording; and issues present in all types of 
survey data. For instance, while Kantar Worldpanel by design 
only collects data on purchases that are brought into the home 
and matches scanned data with scanned receipts to ensure accu-
racy, a comparison of Kantar Worldpanel data with the Living 
Cost and Food survey has shown that the former to have lower 
levels of recorded alcohol expenditure.25 Insofar as the under-re-
cording of alcohol is higher than that of non-alcoholic drinks 
this might bias the estimated demand relationships. Regardless 
of the models used, estimating demand requires a number of 
assumptions (see online supplementary appendix 1), which 
may have influenced the estimates. We prioritised an approach 
that allowed controlling for unobservable household heteroge-
neity, including in the preferences towards different types of 
drinks, while also adjusting for non-purchase and endogeneity 
issues. In addition we identify the statistical significance of the 
estimates based on bootstrapped standard errors to overcome 
issues of remaining heterogeneity in the data as well bias arising 
from dealing with censoring. Overall, own-price elasticities are 
estimated with greater robustness as an a priori expectation of 
an inverse relationship with price exists and own prices have 
a noticeable impact on purchases. However, the estimation of 
substitution or complementarity effects across products are 
harder to capture, as these are generally much smaller and the 
direction cannot be assumed a priori for most beverages.30
Perhaps more critically, although this analysis can highlight 
significant relationships between beverages purchased, it cannot 
explain why these relationships exist. Why, for example, would 
an increase in price of high-sugar drinks appear to cause some 
mid-income households to reduce expenditure on them, but also 
increase their purchase of lager? It may be that it narrows the 
relative price difference to make lager appear more ‘affordable’, 
through changing the households’ cost-benefit calculations of 
SSB versus lager, but this sort of behavioural explanation requires 
further, primary, research. It may be easier to explain some of 
the complementary relationships – that for instance purchase 
of beer or wine falls as the price of SSB increases as there is 
less money available overall, or because for some drinks they 
are mixed, but again we cannot really understand the possible 
explanations without further primary research. Nonetheless, 
the presence of this range of significant substitute and comple-
mentary relationships between SSB and other alcoholic and 
Table 2 Mean expenditure, expenditure shares and prices
All st dev Low Income st dev Mid Income st dev high Income st dev
Total monthly beverage expenditure (£) 29.9 7.42 24.6 6.8 31.7 7.6 36 7.88
Expenditure share (%)
  High sugar soft drinks 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.23 0.12 0.21
  Less sugar soft drinks 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.07
  Low sugar/diet soft drinks 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.29
  Fruit juices 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.16 0.24
  Milk-based drinks 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.08
  Bottled water 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11
  Beer 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12
  Lager 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.15
  Cider 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.1
  Wines 0.18 0.29 0.15 0.28 0.19 0.29 0.22 0.3
  Spirits 0.08 0.2 0.09 0.22 0.08 0.2 0.07 0.18
Prices
  High sugar soft drinks 0.92 0.06 0.92 0.05 0.92 0.06 0.93 0.06
  Less sugar soft drinks 0.96 0.16 0.96 0.15 0.96 0.16 0.98 0.16
  Low sugar/diet soft drinks 0.69 0.07 0.69 0.06 0.69 0.07 0.71 0.07
  Fruit juices 1.11 0.08 1.10 0.08 1.10 0.08 1.12 0.09
  Milk-based drinks 1.51 0.18 1.51 0.17 1.51 0.18 1.53 0.19
  Bottled water 0.33 0.04 0.33 0.04 0.33 0.04 0.33 0.04
  Beer 2.63 0.25 2.61 0.25 2.62 0.25 2.66 0.27
  Lager 1.95 0.17 1.94 0.16 1.95 0.16 1.98 0.18
  Cider 2.12 0.23 2.11 0.23 2.12 0.23 2.15 0.25
  Wines 5.82 0.37 5.79 0.36 5.81 0.37 5.89 0.40
  Spirits 16.31 1.66 16.26 1.58 16.30 1.65 16.42 1.86
N (Household months) 575 965 198 464 287 966 89 535
Number of households 31 919 11 422 15 680 4817
Average unit prices (£) over geographical areas (n=110); Low income <£20 000 per year; mid-income £20 000 – £ 49 000; high-income >£50 000+.
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non-alcoholic beverages suggests an urgent need for follow-up 
work based on with primary research to understand the reasons 
for the relationships.
In conclusion, increasing the price of SSBs has the potential 
to both decrease and increase the purchase of alcohol across all 
income groups. An increase in the price of high-sugar drinks 
may cause a significant increase in purchase of lager for the 
middle-income group and decrease in cider for the high-income 
group. An increase in the price of medium-sugar drinks tends 
to reduce purchase of beer, and lager across all income groups, 
generating a ‘healthy multiplier’ effect for the price increase. An 
increase in the price of diet/low-sugar drinks, however, generates 
increased purchase of all categories of alcohol with the exception 
of spirits. On balance, a policy to increase the price of SSB needs 
Figure 1 Change in the demand if price of SSBs increases (full sample, N=575 965). High-sugar SSBs include >8g of sugar per 100mL; medium-
sugar SSBs include 5–8g of sugar/100mL and low-sugar SSBs have <5g of sugar/100mL.
Figure 2 Change in the demand if price of SSBs increases (low-income sample; N=198 464). High-sugar SSBs include >8g of sugar per 100mL; 
medium-sugar SSBs include 5–8g of sugar/100mL and low-sugar SSBs have <5g of sugar/100mL.
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to consider the sugar-content level at which a price increase 
would be imposed to have most effect. Conversely, any policy 
that increases the price of diet/low-sugar drinks could produce 
substitution patterns to alcoholic drinks that is likely to be unde-
sirable. This is important for proposed industry levies, such as 
that proposed for the UK, as industry is free to determine how to 
recoup the levy from consumers with an option to increase the 
price of all drinks, including diet drinks. If so, this could reduce 
the beneficial effects from a rise in the price of medium-sugar 
drinks and add negative effects from diet drink price increases 
through the increased purchase of alcohol. Although not defini-
tive, the relationships found in this analysis are sufficiently robust 
Figure 3 Change in the demand if price of SSBs increases (mid-income sample; N=287 966). High-sugar SSBs include >8g of sugar per 100mL; 
medium-sugar SSBs include 5–8g of sugar/100mL and low-sugar SSBs have <5g of sugar/100mL.
Figure 4 Change in the demand if price of SSBs increases (high-income sample; N=89 535). High-sugar SSBs include >8g of sugar per 100mL; 
medium-sugar SSBs include 5–8g of sugar/100mL and low-sugar SSBs have <5g of sugar/100mL.
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to suggest that policies – and research – concerning the price of 
SSBs need to consider the effects beyond the SSBs targeted and 
support the need for further primary research on the behaviour 
patterns associated with alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverage 
choices.
What is already known on this subject
The WHO promotes taxation on tobacco, alcohol, and unhealthy 
foods, and particularly sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB) as 
a central government tool to reduce their consumption and 
prevent non-communicable diseases. Alcohol has been highly 
taxed for decades in many countries and there is by now a large 
body of literature on the price responsiveness for alcoholic 
drinks. With increasing interest in fiscal measures on unhealthy 
food and drink, research on the demand for SSB has grown 
over the past three decades. But, the demand interrelationships 
between them are unknown; important as both contribute to 
energy intake and come with their own set of health risks.
What this study adds
This is the first study to analyse the demand for non-alcoholic 
and alcoholic beverages in the same analysis, based on data 
from a representative sample of ~32 000 GB households for 
2012–2013 providing ~6 million individual beverage purchases 
for at-home consumption, which are aggregated into 11 
beverage groups. The study highlights the complexity of 
estimating the impact of a single price increase, for example, 
for SSBs. Increasing the price of SSBS has the potential to both 
decrease and increase the purchase of alcohol, suggesting more 
nuanced price options across a range of beverages may be more 
effective than a single tax on high-sugar beverages.
Correction notice This article has been corrected since it was published Online 
First. Any references to ’Kantar WorldPanel’ or ’KWP’ have been corrected to ’Kantar 
Worldpanel’.
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